NAXALISM

 Persistent Threat: In 1964, CPM splits from CPI, and decides to withhold from taking part in elections, to plan a revolutionary uprising in India as per the format of any Communist ideology. In 1967, the first Naxalism uprising takes place at Naxalbari, where Charu Majumdar launched the first peasant uprising.

The first 25 years of the Naxalite insurgency were characterized by the communist principles on which the movement was founded. Fighting for land reform, the rebels gained support from the impoverished rural populations of eastern and central India. The Maoist rebellion quickly adopted violence and terror as the core instruments of its struggle against the Indian authority. Primary targets included railway tracks, post offices, and other state infrastructure, demonstrating the Maoists’ commitment to undermining a central government that they believed exploited low castes and rural populations. As states and the central government employed uncoordinated and underfunded responses to the Naxalites, the threat expanded beyond West Bengal and its neighboring states.

In 2004, the two predominant rebel groups, the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) and the People’s War Group (PWG), merged together. The resulting Communist Party of India (Maoist) emerged as a solidified base of power for the Naxalites, with a stated goal of overthrowing the Indian government. It has developed in its modern form as a rebellion that comprises up to 40,000 permanent armed cadres and 100,000 additional militia members. According to the South Asia Intelligence Review, Maoist violence bears responsibility for 998 deaths in 2009, representing the highest one-year total since 1971.

The Expansion of the Rebellion: The nascent stages of the movement reflected the stark contrast between urbanized areas of India and the primarily rural, underdeveloped regions of Naxalite influence. With the Maoist rebels firmly entrenched in geographically remote areas, Indian government resources remained dedicated to urban security and development concerns. As India looks increasingly to its east for vital resources, the conflict continues to expand beyond the principles of its origin. With a growing population and new development initiatives that require additional coal-powered electricity sources, India’s urban centers have come into direct contact with the states most affected by the Naxalite uprising: West Bengal, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra.

There have been often kidnapping cases of government officials by Naxalities and recently for the first time, kidnapping of two foreign Italian Nationals.

Rising Urban Influence: A striking development of the evolving Naxalite strategy includes infiltration of Indian urban centers and a shift away from the confines of the rural eastern corridor. While recruitment of militants for attacks on government targets remains limited to the states traditionally affected by Maoist influence, leaders of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) – the CPI (Maoist) – and militant cadres are turning toward Indian cities for the recruitment of sympathizers and logistical support. In 2007, two prominent members of the CPI (Maoist) were arrested in Mumbai and found in possession of weapons caches, having used the city as a base for their operations. The following year, more than 400 rebels unleashed unprecedented attacks on the urban towns of Nayagarh and Daspalla in Orissa.

The Economics of the Insurgency: In addition to the movement toward urban centers, the Naxalites have opened new pathways for financial gain and the funding of insurgency operations. Traditionally, funding has exploited the impoverished rural classes that the movement claims to represent. According to Indian Home Secretary G. K. Pillai, the Maoist insurgents extort 14 billon Indian rupees (more than $300 million) each year. By brandishing the threat of violence, the Naxalites make advantageous use of the power vacuum in rural Indian territories. Fees are collected from rural business owners, landowners, and local politicians.

As businesses have sought to expand into the resource-rich regions controlled by the Naxalites, an additional opportunity for profit has arisen, albeit one that conflicts with the ideological basis of the Maoist movement. In the years of forcible land acquisition, the Naxalites still turned profits by exacting fees from businesses, such as paper mills, that generated revenue from the land. As India has shifted toward a system where land is voluntarily sold to businesses, the insurgents have used violence as a tool to disrupt the aspirations of corporate groups such as Vedanta and Tata.

Renewed Government Response: The Government from the beginning of Naxalism, as treated this as a law and order problem when it is much more than that. The real problem lays in the problem of poverty and under-development in the areas affected by Naxalism. Naxalism has gained support easily in areas, where there seems to be lack of development, poverty and exploitation.

In a 2006 speech, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that Naxalism remains “the single biggest internal security challenge” that India has ever faced. Under the guidance of Home Minister P. Chidambaram, India has begun to embrace an unprecedented commitment toward addressing this threat. At the end of 2009, India launched a counteroffensive that called for the deployment of more than 50,000 paramilitary soldiers to the regions most affected by the insurgency’s increased violence. In previous years, the Indian government tacitly supported the failed efforts of locally operated militias, such as the Salwa Judum in the state of Chhattisgarh. Chidambaram’s action instead draws a combined force from the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Border Security Force, Sashastra Seema Bal, Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) and the Nagaland Armed Police. Deemed “Operation Green Hunt,” the counteroffensive includes the use of helicopters and drones with aerial strike capabilities that can provide support to the land forces. To date, the results of the operation have had varying levels of success. While at times the intensified military and police involvement has led to Naxalite calls for peace talks, other instances have led to reprisal attacks by insurgent groups.

The Role of Police: Regardless of the inroads made by committed military and police engagement, a solution to the Maoist insurgency will ultimately require effective governance and lasting security measures in the states most affected by the threat. In the absence of federal forces, state police are responsible for security issues pertaining to their individual state. Commonly the targets of militant attacks, these police forces maintain a relatively sparse presence in the eastern corridor.

Successes: Massive increases to the state police force coincided with widespread intelligence gathering. During the period of ceasefire, officials developed a vast intelligence network through negotiations with the rebels, as well as the implementation of a multilayered governmental bureaucracy alongside an abundance of state offices and infrastructure. Coupled with massive increases to both the size and budget of police forces, the Naxalites’ capabilities of resistance and recruitment became significantly weakened. Developmental projects that forged ties to the tribal populations proved essential toward limiting the influence of Maoist insurgents.

The Changing Future of the Conflict: India is committed to addressing its internal security challenges. Its strong offensive against the Naxalites demonstrates a strengthened ability to organize for the task. In the past, India has experienced the difficulties of integrating national and local efforts to form a cohesive counterinsurgency against constantly emerging militant groups. To achieve its objectives against the Maoist revolt, India will need to instill strong and effective governance throughout the Red Corridor. The positive example of Andhra Pradesh provides a crucial pathway for the Indian government to follow as it seeks to maintain control not only over its territory but over its citizens as well. This week’s attacks in Chhattisgarh demonstrate the urgency that the Indian state must adopt in transferring these past successes to both security and development in the Red Corridor. The recent events have sent shock waves throughout the core of the Indian security community and will undoubtedly lead to a reevaluation of both federal and state policies. Chidambaram has publicly ruled out an imminent military reprisal, but he has left open the possibility of reviewing India’s approach to the Naxalite insurgency. As a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy continues to develop, improved governance and the ability to follow successful precedents will remain essential for India to look optimistically toward its future.

@A Modern Insurgency: India’s Evolving Naxalite Problem

William Magioncalda